Bob Veres is traveling and asked me to post this email:

Let me start my rebuttal of the rebuttal by pointing out the good things about the research. I think it was good that Ibbotson disclosed that the paper represented sponsored research right on the cover page, although I think the particulars might have been discussed more prominently than a footnote on page three. And I thought that Mr. Chen was quite open with me in my followup interview with him, candid and, when he was not happy with the nature of my questions, clear about his unhappiness. So it's a little disappointing that he says there were quotes taken out of context. It's a direct shot at my reputation, and I feel comfortable standing on my history of not distorting what I was told or twisting facts. In this profession, the facts and quotes are usually interesting enough without any twisting.

I also agree, completely, that the VA should not make up more than a small part of an overall portfolio. Of course the comparison in the white paper is between VAs and mutual funds, and any comparison will be on that part of the mutual fund portfolio that the VA is replacing. I didn't assume 100% of the portfolio; I simply compared (as the white paper did) the mutual fund vs. VA part of a client's holdings.

To say that my return assumptions were flawed is interesting, because I simply took the return assumptions from Table 1 of the white paper itself. Later, the paper does a Monte Carlo analysis, and assumes (I think correctly) that stocks will, over the long term, offer higher average annual returns than bonds. I did have a problem with the paper making this assumption, and then putting a higher weighting to stocks in the VA contract vs. a mutual fund portfolio. Maybe I'm the only one who thinks that looks like rigging the comparison in favor of the VA contract. No advisor I've ever talked with says that you should abandon prudent asset allocation principles inside a VA contract or outside; the research cited in this rebuttal is primarily from consumers, not advisor-tended portfolios, and I suspect there would be difference between the two. Maybe not.

Bigger picture, why compare VAs to mutual funds at all? The only people I have ever seen make that comparison are annuity salespeople. Mutual funds and annuities are very different products, very different tools used for very different purposes. The only reason you would try to argue that a wrench is superior to a screwdriver is if you happened to be a wrench salesperson.

It's true that my column didn't pay a lot of attention to the guarantee because I think the chances of the insurance company paying on that guarantee are not high--which goes straight to the cost issue. How likely is it that the portfolio will be totally extinguished? Once you calculate that likelihood, how much is the guarantee worth, compared with what the insurance company is charging? I did try out a variety of different return sequences, and none of them had the annuity running totally out of money (and the insurance company reaching into its pocket) over a 30-year retirement, enhanced distributions or no. Taking 5% a year out of the portfolio, even at the high water mark, is a pretty conservative distribution rate, especially when the distribution is frozen for the years between high water marks. As Bill Bengen famously pointed out, if somebody retired at the start of the Great Depression, he still could have taken 4.5% of the first year's portfolio value, and indexed that to inflation and taken increasing returns thereafter for thirty years, and still been safe.

Which brings me to the fees. I'm not sure who to believe here, but Morningstar itself says that the typical M&E cost for VA contracts is 125 basis points (see https://ibd.morningstar.com/DataDefs/VASnapshot.htm ), not 120, and as I pointed out (and the white paper correctly calculated), the GMWB fee can be 1% of the actual assets in the portfolio--or more, especially if the subaccount value goes down and it looks as if insurance is needed. But to say that this the M&E covers the advisory fee for the duration of the relationship is, well, an interesting assumption. Assume the advisor gets paid 4% up-front for recommending the annuity.  At most, that pays for four years of the advisor's efforts on behalf of the client. But the insurance company doesn't lower that 125 basis point M&E charge after four years, and the contract life is expected, in this white paper, to be 30 years or more. Who pays for the advisor's advice for the other 26 years? The Good Fairy? The mutual fund portfolio, meanwhile, is assumed to be paying 1% to the advisor each and every year. And of course the white paper ignored the impact of contingent deferred sales charges, which I happen to think are significant in those early years.

Finally, I appreciate the fact that Mr. Chen agrees that taxes can be important. But I'm a little surprised to see him recommending VA contracts inside IRA or pension funds. Only the most aggressive salespeople are pounding that particular drum.

Bottom line: I hope, as Mr. Chen does, that all advisors read the paper on the Ibbotson web site. It's a great conversation-starter, and in my opinion (possibly not shared by everybody) it shows something I doubt Mr. Chen intended: how the numbers can be adjusted to make VAs look like a superior option to the other investments on the market. Don't take my word for it; before long, your clients will be hearing from annuity salespeople who will be leaning hard on this research to support their sales activities, and I guarantee you that THEY won't be talking about using their annuities for only a small part of the client portfolio.

Bob Veres

Bob Veres still seems to be missing some pivotal points in Dr. Chen's article.  For example, he writes -

"I did have a problem with the paper making this assumption, and then putting a higher weighting to stocks in the VA contract vs. a mutual fund portfolio. Maybe I'm the only one who thinks that looks like rigging the comparison in favor of the VA contract. No advisor I've ever talked with says that you should abandon prudent asset allocation principles inside a VA contract or outside; the research cited in this rebuttal is primarily from consumers, not advisor-tended portfolios, and I suspect there would be difference between the two. "

The whole point of "putting a higher weighting to stocks in the VA contract vs. a mutual fund portfolio" is that, in the VA contract, the presence of a GLB permits such additional weighting without the downside risk that would result in the absence of the GLB.

Bob asks "why compare VAs to mutual funds at all? The only people I have ever seen make that comparison are annuity salespeople."

Aw, come ON, Bob!  I don't know how many such comparisons I've seen, (dozens, certainly) but at least half, if not more, were produced by financial journalists.  Are Suzy Orman and Jane Bryant Quinn "annuity salespeople"?

As to Bob's discussion of fees, he seems not to be aware of the various commission payout arrangements available to sellers of VAs.  For example, he writes  -

"But to say that this the M&E covers the advisory fee for the duration of the relationship is, well, an interesting assumption. Assume the advisor gets paid 4% up-front for recommending the annuity.  At most, that pays for four years of the advisor's efforts on behalf of the client. But the insurance company doesn't lower that 125 basis point M&E charge after four years, and the contract life is expected, in this white paper, to be 30 years or more. Who pays for the advisor's advice for the other 26 years? The Good Fairy? But to say that this the M&E covers the advisory fee for the duration of the relationship is, well, an interesting assumption. Assume the advisor gets paid 4% up-front for recommending the annuity.  At most, that pays for four years of the advisor's efforts on behalf of the client. But the insurance company doesn't lower that 125 basis point M&E charge after four years, and the contract life is expected, in this white paper, to be 30 years or more. Who pays for the advisor's advice for the other 26 years? The Good Fairy? "

Let's look at that argument a bit closely:

Bob's statement that if the advisor is paid an up-front commission for recommending the annuity, that amount (which Bob assumes is 4%; it's often more) "pays for four years of the advisor's efforts on behalf of the client". 

No, it doesn't.  Nearly every commissionable VA pays "trail" commissions, similar to those paid by mutual fund "A" shares.

More to the point, most VA contracts offer the selling advisor an option as to commission payout.  It's true that many advisors take the "heaped up front" option, so they're compensated as if they'd sold "A" mutual fund shares.  (Who pays for those latter advisors' advice for the remainder of the advisor/client relationship, Bob - the Good Fairy?).  But many will opt for levelized payouts - where the "trail" commission is about 1%.

And that ongoing commission is paid for, not by the Good Fairy, but by the ongoing M&E charge that Bob wondered about. 

What about when the advisor elects to take his money all up front, with little or no trail?  How is that advisor being compensated for the later years of the advisory relationship?  The answer is simple:  HE GOT HIS MONEY UP FRONT!  That's what he CHOSE.

Personally, I think that's a LOUSY way to compensated an advisor for a long-term advisor/client relationship, but it's hardly unique to variable annuities.  It's how mutual funds have worked for decades.

Bob also observes "But I'm a little surprised to see him recommending VA contracts inside IRA or pension funds. Only the most aggressive salespeople are pounding that particular drum."

Well, I must be an "aggressive salesperson" then, because I frequently recommend a VA inside an IRA.  But it's NEVER a tax-related recommendation, because THERE ARE NO ADVANTAGES OR DISADVANTAGES TO USING A VA INSIDE AN IRA.  Any advantages or disadvantages have to do with suitability as an investment vehicle OR AS A RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL within that IRA account.

Not incidentally, while I have no quibble with using a VA inside an IRA or QP account - if the investment and/or risk management features make it suitable - I am not a fan of using VAs in NON-qualified accounts, unless they contain Guaranteed Living Benefits.  Why?  Because, in my opinion, the advantage of tax-deferral that variable annuities enjoy is not worth the cost for that deferral - namely: All Ordinary Income treatment of ALL distributions, plus the 72(q) penalty for early distributions. 

That is NOT the case with NON-VARIABLE annuities, because, while they get All Ordinary Income treatment too, so do those investment vehicles with which fixed annuities may be properly compared (CDs, Bonds, Bond Funds).

Why do I make an exception for VAs in NQ accounts when they contain Guaranteed Living Benefits?  Because it may well be that the risk management features outweigh the tax disadvantages.  That is quite possible where the risk tolerance of the purchaser is such that he or she would not consider a heavily equity-weighted allocation in the absence of those GLBs.

Annuities in general (with some exceptions, such as so-called "CD annuities") are not (in my view, at least) primarily investments.  They're primarily risk management tools.  This is certainly true when the annuity in question is a variable contract containing a Guaranteed Living Benefit (or, perhaps, a Guaranteed Death Benefit).


- John L. Olsen, CLU, ChFC, AEP

withdraw

Vig Goren writes "The problem is with those unscrupulous salesmen pushing unsuitable annuity products such as deferred VAs, upon naïve buyers".

Actually, the problem is with self-appointed critics who make foolish and unsubstantiated summary judgments such as the one above.

Vig has repeatedly demonstrated a palpable animus against commissionable products and those who sell them; he's also demonstrated, repeatedly, that he knows little or nothing about the things he condemns.

The "low-cost" VAs that Vig touts -

(a) do not compensate the seller, which means that either the buyer gets no advice or he must pay extra for it.  That doesn't make these contracts bad.  It just means that they cannot be compared, head-to-head, with contracts that do compensate the seller for his or her financial advice.

(b) offer limited, IF ANY, "guaranteed living benefits".  If one doesn't NEED those features, it's certainly arguable that one shouldn't pay for them, which might suggest a low-fee VA that doesn't offer them. To my mind, a better course might be to avoid buying any VA, if the purchase money is non-qualified.  I believe that the benefit of tax-deferral offered by a variable annuity is not worth the cost (All Ordinary Income treatment).   But when GLBs are added, the paradigm changes.

Commissionable VAs that include GLBs can offer RISK MANAGEMENT benefits that are arguably unobtainable elsewhere for most buyers.  Whether those RM benefits are worth the price charged is certainly arguable, and Peng Chen addressed that issue in his paper.  (So did Bob Veres in his response, but Bob made some bad assumptions and presumptions.  That said, I have a LOT of respect for Bob Veres; I simply believe he let his bias overwhelm his admirable good sense when he wrote that response).  Both Chen and Veres tried to inform us by applying original thought to the issue.

It's an approach I recommend to Vig Goren.

- John Olsen

"Vig has repeatedly demonstrated a palpable animus against commissionable products and those who sell them."


John:

Let us not forget that famous line from Vig...  The one about how advisory based advisors are "Ripping off" their clients.  At least Vig is equal handed in his contempe for practising advisors.

Amber

How longer would the slander by the above nasty poster be allowed on this "cleaned" website?

Come on folks, let's stick to the topic, there's plenty here to discuss. If someone's idea doesn't hold water better to show why than try to discredit the poster....

-Tad

Bob Veres' title, "Cheerleaders in Lab Coats," does raise a good question...when I see Ibbotson (an almost - though not entirely - "academic" brand pre-Morningstar) doing sponsored studies it's hard not to invoke thoughts of other industry sponsored (read: bogus) "research." An egregious example would be The Tobacco Institute. Another advisor actually called me awhile ago about some other study, the basic point being -- doesn't Ibbotson seem a little different now? So just a comment regarding Ibbotson, I wonder if they've weighed the value of that brand against doing industry-sponsored research...a phrase that some of us consider to be almost oxymoronic. There are plenty of trade associations to handle that stuff -- NAVA, etc. -- that's what they're there for. You read that, you read the ICI stuff, and you read "studies" directly from product companies, and you know the potential biases.

[Though if anyone wants to start sponsoring leather-bound annual copies of the SBBI Yearbook I think that would be a wonderful idea, send one to my address immediately and I'll shut up! =) ]

But that leads to the second point...there aren't enough hours in a day to read all the industry-sponsored research, especially about beaten to death topics in financial planning. I skim the assumptions and decide accordingly. And I'm sorry but Peng Chen's statement above implicitly seems to invalidate the case used to prove the thesis, no?:

Peng Chen writes...
"Not for everyone:  Throughout the white paper, we state many times that VAs with lifetime GMWB are not appropriate for every investor (e.g., investors with...a great deal of wealth)"

BV's column cites from the case...
"The GWMB really kicks in after the down market of 2000, when the account value drops from a 1999 high of $3.8 million...to $2.2 million at the end of 2002... the contract keeps paying what it paid in 1999: $191,578."

Say WHAT?

This isn't "a great deal of wealth?" It is to anyone who's looked at, say, the SCF data (except perhaps the speech writers for Democratic primary debates - with those $200k/year "middle class" families).

Look:
there are plenty of $3.8 retirees out there, but longevity risk isn't much of an issue for that group - think about what the term means. Talk about "longevity risk" for the early retiree with $40,000 in CDs and the concept makes some sense. And come up with the completely market-paranoid individual who just can't get past the concept of short-term volatility...to the point where they're willing to guarantee and lock in substantially larger costs during investment and, god forbid, early/unexpected liquidation, to deal with that potential volatility - and these products are a way to manage that risk. I haven't met that individual yet, but I can accept arguendo that they're out there and that this approach is at least a turnkey solution to the problem.

But build a case around $191,578 in "required" annual income and a $3.8 million portfolio, while footnoting that the approach isn't right for those "with a great deal of wealth," and you kind of lose those of us who are advisers on planet earth.

Especially when the investment mix seems to leave a lot of room for improvement ($3.8 to $2.2 in three years with only 5% withdrawals??).

Tack on that 300 basis point cost assumption (which still needs an advisor-fee of some type tacked on top of it, to provide all the other money-related advice that comes up that a rep handling that annuity typically wouldn't do) and...well I don't want to click that link to look at the paper, I have actual work to do. It would waste time, and Ibbotson would just get reinforcement about its "sponsored research" by having another download to count.

-Tad

[Sorry for the messy formatting, that was second post via copy-paste.]

Tad,

You write "Especially when the investment mix seems to leave a lot of room for improvement ($3.8 to $2.2 in three years with only 5% withdrawals??)."

The decrease in value was not the result of partial withdrawals, so much as of a massive bear market.  The GLB would have permitted the contract owner to continue taking 5% of the larger figure for life, even after the actual account balance fell 43%.

And you write "Tack on that 300 basis point cost assumption (which still needs an advisor-fee of some type tacked on top of it, to provide all the other money-related advice that comes up that a rep handling that annuity typically wouldn't do) and...well I don't want to click that link to look at the paper, I have actual work to do. It would waste time, and Ibbotson would just get reinforcement about its "sponsored research" by having another download to count."

300 BP/yr is a reasonably accurate figure for the total annual cost of a fully-commissionable VA with a GLWB, including subaccount expenses.  Some advisors will sell that contract and opt to get paid in one lump sum up front.  Others (including Yours Truly) will opt for a "C share type" payout, with a trail commission of 100 bps/yr.
There is, in EITHER scenario, no need to tack on an advisor fee.  The cost of advice is included in that figure, just as it is in the figure for the mutual fund portfolio side (where a 100 bps/yr AUM fee was assumed).

I don't like "heaped commissions" on VAs one bit.  They encourage churning.  They don't match compensation with work performed.

John Olsen

300 BP/yr is a reasonably accurate figure for the total annual cost of a fully-commissionable VA with a GLWB, including subaccount expenses. Some advisors will sell that contract and opt to get paid in one lump
sum up front.  Others (including Yours Truly) will opt for a "C share type" payout, with a trail commission of 100 bps/yr.

There is, in EITHER scenario, no need to tack on an advisor fee.  The cost of advice is included in that figure, just as it is in the figure for the mutual fund portfolio side (where a 100 bps/yr AUM fee was assumed).

John,
This is interesting...is it fair to say that you're an exceptional case, rather than a typical one? Meaning, with respect to ongoing services and choice of trail over lump-sum.

I'd be interested to see what the typical "service mix received" is for a VA purchaser, over the life of the product...and how it compares when the agent opts for lump sum rather than trail. Then a comparison to some other approaches, whether it's RR/mutual funds, RIA/mutual funds, etc. So few VAs are annuitized, and so much VA activity is contract replacement, that the sample might not be very big -- but they're out there.

To generalize it -- I think a consumer sees a very wide range of service levels across service providers. I believe that's true both within each pay/licensing model, and among them. But my belief is that the VA+lump is likely to be a "turnkey" product with much less ongoing advice associated with it (perhaps none other than contract-related). That's certainly been the case with inbound clients, but then again, perhaps that's the reason they left the firm that sold them the VA.

So to me it's a bit of a throw-away for a study to say "well they incur the cost of the VA but they won't need to pay any advisory fees." It says to me they might have a narrow view of the expected service levels for this type of client. A lot is going to come up that will require new advice and new costs for that advice because the original agent is unwilling (or unable, because of licensing) to provide it. Seven years from now the client has a grandchild, wants to factor her into the overall mix somehow...is that agent who took the lump going to do that work, without the client incurring an additional cost not accounted for in the study? Or - last year the IRA-to-Charity opportunity was there for MRDs, if that was well into annuitization did the lump-pay agent who sold it in 1998 call and solicit that idea (even though it wouldn't lead to a dime of compensation)? These are completely routine questions to address in the context of a long-term advisory relationship for a retiree. I'm highly skeptical the typical lump-pay agent is doing that stuff -- if in fact they're even around anymore...

-Tad

Tad,

The sales commissions paid to the advisor/agent who sells a VA compensates that advisor for ....what?

To my mind, the answer is:  advice regarding that product, for as long as the advisor/client relationship and the annuity contract persist. 

Unfortunately, many  insurance agents who consider themselves "advisors" seem to feel otherwise.  There are those who believe that the commission is compensation for making the sale.  These folks are indistinguishable, in my mind, from the guys who hawk index annuities for everyone, make the sale and...move on.

Most real advisors aren't like that, of course.  But I've talked to more than a few advisors who believe that they're entitled to the 4-7% upfront commission for selling the VA and a new commission on a new VA to which the first one will be exchanged as soon as the surrender charge period expires.  Inappropriate 1035 exchanges have been a Priority One problem for responsible broker/dealers for years.

The problem is not only surmountible, but entirely avoidable.  An advisor may opt for a "levelized" commission arrangement similar to that of "C" mutual fund shares.  It is important to note that the cost to the client need not, and generally does not, increase if the advisor elects this compensation arrangement.

Why don't many advisors do so?  For the same reason that most insurance agents would not elect "levelized" commissions on life insurance policies if they were given the chance.  The commission paid on a life insurance - or annuity - sale must compensate the agent for all the work he or she did to get to that sale.  That means it must pay for all the activity performed, all the phone calls made, to get the three or four interview appointments necessary (for most agents) to net one sale.

There are only so many hours in the day and only so many people an agent can see in a week, and the commissions for products bought by the "closing ratio" percentage of those people must pay for everything the agent did and all of his or her expenses incurred in the process.

This situation is not unique to insurance agents.  Physicians, lawyers, architects, and fee-based financial planners must derive sufficient compensation from the fees paid by "those who buy" to keep the practice, and the practitioner, above water.

The major difference between insurance agents (qua agents) and the other professionals is that the agent is ostensibly selling a product and doesn't get paid unless somebody buys it.  The others sell their advice - really, their time - and get paid whenever they spend that time with a client.

"Heaped commissions" paid on insurance products enable the "advisor"/agent to know that, even if only three out of ten people she sees this week buy something from here, she'll make it.  The problem, of course, is that the compensation is totally unrelated to the time and energy that advisor spends with that client.

There are other, and better, ways of doing all this.  My favorite, and the one I use in my practice for many (but not all) of my engagements is Fee Offset By Commissions.

I charge $200 per hour for giving financial and estate planning advice and I expect to make that whether the client buys a product or not.  If the client does buy a product, I will credit the commissions against my advisory fee.  If the commission completely covers the hourly fee, the client owes nothing further.  If the commission exceeds the hourly fee to date, I owe that client more hours of my time until the accounts balance.  (I do not "rebate" any excess, if for no other reason than that it's illegal in Missouri).

Many of my colleagues and students tell me that they cannot work this way because "clients won't pay fees for insurance advice".  That's certainly true, in my own experience, for many consumers.  Thus, the persistence of the "pure commission" compensation model.

- John

-Tad, I agree with your {to generalize it} and {so to me } observations. In the Bob Veres vs. Peng Chen debate, imo, we cannot add much b/c we are missing details such as: is the VA+ GMWB vs. Mutual Funds benefit  a dollar issue or a risk management one, or partially a bequest one too? If it s a $ issue then what about taxes if it s in a non-qualified plans?

However, as to the merit of combining fixed and variable SPIAs (immediate!) with a stocks and bonds withdrawal portfolio, and with life insurance, I am convinced that such FP tools are very useful for retirees. The only problems are those with agents commissions and insurer s fees which are causing hurdles such as killing mortality credits and thus making the early purchases of the SPIAs a loosing proposition. Peng Chen is an expert in this field.

Let s get Peng over here b/c I would like to get his input to the following:

First, see Peng's report here: http://www.ifid.ca/pdf_workingpapers/WP2003JUN.pdf

1. For IVA they could consider the Vanguard Lifetime Income, joint life, variable payouts (i.e. choosing the funds { yourself}  and paying tax by the IRS tax-excludable-portion method, notice the low costs of less than 0.8% including mortality fee).
   


2. Add a fixed Annuity, SPIA, joint life with no riders. (Taxed also per IRS tax-exculdable- portion method).
   


3. 50% of the nest egg, could stay in a diversified stocks and bonds portfolio at 50/50 allocation. (This will take care of bequests too).
   


4. Any additional needed income,  above the SPIAs income,  would be withdrawn from the portfolio but not to exceed 5% COLAd annual WD of initial value.

Any Comments?

junk clean- up time

To those who suggest that Robinson's article is chiefly a condemnation of Guaranteed Living Benefits (including both those who read the article too quickly and those who didn't bother), that article included the following -

"Thus, although sequence-of-returns risk appears quite low, for those retirees who have the misfortune of retiring just before a prolonged bear market it is possible or perhaps even likely that GLWB riders will provide tangible value relative to a lower-cost mutual fund alternative.

...The data in the tables clearly show that investors who buy variable annuity contracts sacrifice significant long-term performance than if they invested in lower-cost mutual funds, due to the impact of expenses over time. But as noted in the "low water mark" analysis, variable annuity investors might benefit from greater psychological comfort and peace of mind during severe market downturns than mutual fund investors who do not have a lifetime income guarantee.

...Although the value of such benefits is obviously ephemeral, in taking this presumption one step further one might also surmise that the comfort afforded by the GLWB rider may make it more likely that annuity investors will remain invested in equities, whereas mutual fund investors may be more inclined to sell in panic."

- John Olsen

clean-up time

Calling Host, Michael E. Kitces, MSFS, CFP, CLU, ChFC, RHU, REBC

Hi Mike,

By any chances could you please summarize the PROS and CONS of utilizing VAs plus GMWBs?

Please also compare it to other options such as combinations of portfolios with fix and/or IVA SPIAs and life insurance, for attaining clients' goals in taxable and tax-deferred accounts.

Thanks.

Vig, your request to Michael sounds like a JFP piece not a discussion board post!

Any comments from anyone on the cheerleader/lab coat aspect of this? Meaning, do you put sponsored research in the same category as any other white paper?

-Tad

No knock on anyone in particular here...I can only hope to, one day,  be as smart as many of the "talking heads" appear to be.  I work mainly with school employees and see a lot of annuity programs out there, both good and bad;  I also occasionally see mutual funds and/or managed accounts in the school employees portfolio. 
What I am wondering is: where are all you "fee based" reps?  As most people know, school employees don't make a lot of money and are not particularly sophisticated when it comes to money matters so,  I can only assume that they are, for the most part ignored by the fee based community.  I think it would be a good thing for these companies to market to the middle class a bit more; however, I don't see it happening since Wealth Management is the topic of the day/week.  Each month retired school employees across the United States thank God for their annuities-A little balance in your dialogue perhaps.

Chad,

I believe that, while it's reasonable to suspect that a research effort is more likely to favor the sponsor's point of view than to disfavor it, that doesn't justify dismissing the research conclusions as tainted.   (I'm not suggesting that you take that position, merely that some do.  Bob Veres implied as much).

If the conclusions of a research paper are logically sound and if the assumptions supporting those conclusions are reasonable, then does it really matter who paid for those conclusions?

- John Olsen