One of the annoying things about writing an article for this magazine (as I did last month) is that whenever I take off my columnist hat and put on the hat of a working journalist, I have to shift gears suddenly. I must move from sharing my opinions and prejudices (and sometimes fantasies) to becoming reasonably objective and reporting only facts.

The article in question concerned the CFP Board and actions by and about the Disciplinary and Ethics Commission. My writing was not noticeably improved by the fact that I have friends and respected colleagues on both sides of the controversy, all of whom probably hoped (and maybe even expected) that I would support their position.

Greatest Fears

When you step back far enough, the two positions can be boiled down to this: CFP directors have always believed that they are capable and concerned stewards of the CFP mark. They think that the profession is constantly, unfairly accusing them of having some kind of secret agenda, when in fact their deliberations are always focused on the best interests of the CFP mark. Their greatest fear is that the Board will become subordinated to the profession and thereby lose its credibility as a guardian of the public interest.

Members of the profession, meanwhile, point to some of those questionable decisions-the introduction of an Associate CFP designation with greatly reduced standards, the creation of standards of practice that leave out the fiduciary concept, the recent transfer of authority over the board's disciplinary processes to staff members-as evidence that the Board cannot be trusted, even when we respect, admire and are friends with those making these decisions. In the view of practitioners, the Board must be watched and held accountable. Their greatest fear is that the next rogue action the Board takes might do incalculable harm, and this decision would survive the outrage of the profession.

Source of Conflict

How is it possible for reasonable, intelligent people to be so far apart? It seems clear that the Board has a natural tendency to want to expand the influence of the CFP mark and to broaden its own influence as well.

This is not a nefarious instinct. With a strong Code of Professional Standards in place, the Board would like a greater number of advisors to be following it. Imagine a world where insurance agents disclosed commissions and conflicts of interest before the sale. Imagine that if an agent recommended an equity-indexed annuity, he or she would know that the Disciplinary and Ethics Commission (DEC), and perhaps a jury as well, would want to know whether that investment was better for the client than a diversified portfolio of exchange-traded funds and would hold that recommendation to a fiduciary standard. Wouldn't that be a great place to live?

Members of the CFP community somehow sense the Board's expansionist agenda, recognize the natural tendency to want to promote the CFP farther and wider and imagine that there is a conspiracy at work. After all, the fastest, easiest way for the Board to expand the CFP's Code of Conduct is to see to it that more advisors have the CFP designation. That, in fact, was the straightforward logic behind the Associate CFP designation, and it was doubtless part of the thinking that led to a fiduciary-less code of conduct.

So members of the CFP community darkly suspect that the Board is secretly meeting with representatives from the big wirehouse organizations, negotiating an arrangement in which their reps will get to take an easier, scaled-down CFP test or otherwise be fast-tracked to the designation. They predict that the Board is dumbing down the test for all participants to get a 100% pass rate. They imagine that there will be selective enforcement of the DEC's procedures, so that brokers will get negotiated slaps on the wrist the next time they are told to recommend securitized subprime mortgages to their customers because the company's own inventory is dangerously overstocked.

But the CFP community has its own conflict. If there is value to the CFP designation, then those who have it would naturally want it to be as exclusive as possible. Ideally, they would want more stringent standards, tougher tests and higher hurdles. In fact, they would want the test rigged, so that none of those competing wirehouse brokers could get the designation, and they (the current CFP holders) would have a monopoly on the educational credential.

Both sides are confused. The CFP community thinks that something happens to members of the CFP directors that causes them to take leave of their senses. The Board seems genuinely bewildered when there is a sudden uproar from the CFP community over this or that initiative.